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ADEQUATE PROTECTION-THE EQUITABLE YARDSTICK OF
CHAPTER 11
I. INTRODUCTION
A debtor who files a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 19781 (the Code) triggers the automatic stay provisions of the
Code.2 The automatic stay precludes creditors from enforcing their rights
in the collateral pending further order of the Bankruptcy Court.' An issue
which has spurred continued controversy is whether undersecured credi-
tors who are stayed from repossessing their collateral are entitled to com-
pensation for the delay in enforcing their rights in the collateral. It is
agreed that the concept of adequate protection provides for the preserva-
tion of the value of the collateral due to its use, depreciation, or age.4
However, the Circuit Courts of Appeals are not in accord in determining
whether an undersecured creditor should be compensated for more than
the collateral's depreciation. This circuit court split has to some extent
been resolved by the recent United States Supreme Court opinion af-
firming a Fifth Circuit decision finding that an undersecured creditor is
not entitled to compensation for the delay caused by the automatic stay
in foreclosing on the collateral 5
This Comment addresses the question of adequate protection for un-
dersecured creditors with reference to Congress's recent enactment of the
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 19866 and the policy underlying the
enactment of Chapter 11 of the Code.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-151326
(1982).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
3. See id. Section 362(a) of the Code sets out in detail the statutory restrictions placed
upon secured creditors and other parties claiming an interest in property owned by a debtor
filing for relief under the Code. The automatic stay prevents the creditor from commencing
or continuing any administrative or judicial action, any act to obtain possession of property
of the estate, to create or enforce a lien against property of the estate, or to assess or recover
a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case. Sanctions may
be imposed against a creditor found to have wilfully violated the automatic stay. Id. §
362(h) (Supp. 1982). The creditor may be liable for actual damages including costs and
attorney's fees and, under some circumstances, punitive damages. Id.
4. In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 793 F.2d 1380, 1384 (5th Cir. 1986), afl'd on
rehearing, 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
5. United Savings Assoc. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 108 S. Ct. 626
(1988).
6. Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
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II. MECHANICS OF THE CODE
A. The Automatic Stay
The purpose of the automatic stay is two-fold. It first gives the debtor a
"breathing spell" from his creditors, thus permitting the debtor to at-
tempt a repayment or reorganization plan.7 The stay also provides credi-
tor protection by delineating an orderly liquidation procedure, which
avoids a creditors' race for the debtor's assets.8 The automatic stay is not
permanent. The stay continues until the "property is no longer property
of the estate."" Confirmation of a reorganization plan terminates the exis-
tence of the estate. 10 The automatic stay may otherwise continue until
the case is closed, dismissed, or the discharge is granted or denied."
A secured party may seek relief from the stay under section 362(d) of
the Code.12 That section authorizes the court to "grant relief from the
stay . . . for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an inter-
est in [the] property" of the secured creditor. 3 Section 361 of the Code
sets forth the basic concept of adequate protection.
4
B. The Statutory Guidelines for Adequate Protection
The term "adequate protection" is not defined in section 361 or else-
where in the Code. The Code sets forth nonexclusive guidelines for what
constitutes "adequate protection," but it does not mandate the use of any
7. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 338, 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6296-97.
8. Id. at 341, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6298.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).
10. Id. § 1141(b).
11. Id. § 362(c)(2).
12. Id. § 362(d)(1). The secured party may also seek relief under section 362(d)(2). Relief
will be granted under section 362(d)(2) only if: (A) the debtor does not have an equity in
such property and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. Id. §
362(d)(2).
If the debtor shows that the property is required to effectively reorganize, an under-
secured creditor is limited to seeking relief from the stay under section 362(d)(1). When a
creditor's protection is deemed inadequate, the court may prohibit or condition a debtor's
use, sale or lease of property as is necessary to provide adequate protection to the creditor
having an interest in such property. Id. § 363(e).
13. Id. § 362(d).
14. Id. § 361. The concept of adequate protection applies primarily to Chapter 11 busi-
ness reorganizations, where a debtor is left in possession of its property and allowed to oper-
ate and use its assets to carry out its business. If the creditor's interest in such property is
adversely affected by the debtor's use (section 362), the debtor's sale or lease of property
(section 363), or the debtor incurring debt (section 364) then adequate protection may be
required. Ackerly, Real Estate Interest, VA. INST. ON BANKR. REORGANIZATION, II -10 (1986).
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one of the three methods that it describes. 15 The three examples of ade-
quate protection listed under section 361 include:
(1) requiring ... [a cash payment or] periodic cash payments to [the se-
cured creditor], to the extent that the stay ... results in a decrease in the
value of [the creditor's] interest in such property;
(2) providing . . . an additional or replacement lien to the extent [the]
stay . . . results in a decrease in the value of [the secured creditor's] inter-
est in such property; or
(3) granting such other relief. . . as will result in the realization by [the
secured creditor] of the indubitable equivalent of [its] interest in such
property. 16
The controversy in interpreting section 361 revolves around determin-
ing what interest in the collateral is to be adequately protected, and what
is required to adequately protect that interest.17 Rules of statutory inter-
pretation require that courts construe the statute's language with the
purpose of effecting the intent of Congress when it enacted the legisla-
tion.18 However, an examination of the legislative history of the automatic
stay and adequate protection provisions of the Code breeds even further
controversy because the language of the provisions supports contrasting
interpretations.
C. The Language and Legislative History of Section 361
The 1973 Bankruptcy Commission proposal described adequate protec-
tion as protection against the depreciation of the collateral's value during
the period in which the debtor is using that collateral. 0 It is unclear
whether Congress intended adequate protection to mean more than com-
pensation for the economic depreciation of the creditor's collateral when
it included the concept in the 1978 Code. Section 361(3), as enacted, is
the product of compromise during the House-Senate conference.2 The
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 361.
16. Id.
17. Compare In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that undersecured creditor is entitled to compensation for the delay in enforcing its rights in
the collateral, and compensation may be in the form of postpetition interest payments) with
In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that
sections 362(d)(1) and 361 of the Code do not require post-petition payments for interest or
lost opportunity cost to an undersecured creditor), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
18. Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984).
19. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
20. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 237 (1973).
21. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 432 (citing 124 CONG. REc. H11092 (daily ed. Sept.
28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards)). The Senate proposed a more restrictive version of
adequate protection than did the House. The Senate specified two ways of providing ade-
quate protection. Those two methods were: (1) periodic cash payments to compensate for
19881
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present section 361(3) provides that a secured creditor may be granted
the "indubitable equivalent" of his interest in the collateral.22
Proponents of the theory that an undersecured creditor should be com-
pensated for the loss of income it would have received if it had sold the
collateral and invested the proceeds, 23 rely on the "indubitable
equivalent" language of section 361(3) to support their theory.24 The lost
opportunity cost proponents contend that the source of the "indubitable
equivalent" language in section 361(3) is In re Murel Holding Corp.,25 a
case holding under section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. In Murel,
Judge Hand concluded that the creditor's right to get its money or prop-
erty may be denied under a reorganization plan only if the debtor pro-
vides "'a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.' "28
The "indubitable equivalent" requirement also appears in section
1129(b), the so-called "cram down" provision of the Code.' Under section
depreciation and (2) "'an additional or replacement lien on other property of the debtor to
the extent of the decrease in value or actual consumption of the property involved.'" Tim-
bers, 793 F.2d at 1398 (citing S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1978 US.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5840.
The House proposal provided two additional examples of adequate protection. These in-
cluded "an administrative expense priority to the protected entity to the extent of his loss"
and "such other relief as will result in the realization by the protected entity of the value of
its interest in the property involved." Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1397 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 338, (citing 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963,
6296). The conferees did not adopt the administrative expense priority and added the re-
quirement of "indubitable equivalence," which is included in the current section 361(3).
American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 432.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1982).
23. In re Sun Valley Ranchers, Inc., 43 Bankr. 641 (D. Idaho 1984) explains the basic
concept behind the lost opportunity cost theory. Lost opportunity cost compensation "re-
quires the periodic payment of a sum of cash equal to the interest that the undercollateral-
ized secured creditor might earn on an amount of money equal to the value of the collateral
securing the debt." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 958, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5246, 5250.
24. See, e.g., American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 432-33.
25. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
26. Id. at 942. In Murel, the court rejected a plan in which the debtor offered to pay the
creditor over a ten year period, at 5 '/2 percent interest per year, and without any amortiza-
tion of prinicipal. Judge Hand explained that:
'[A]dequate protection' must be completely compensatory; and that payment ten
years hence is not generally the equivalent of payment now. Interest is indeed the
common measure of the difference, but a creditor who fears the safety of his principal
will scarcely be content with that; he wishes to get his money or at least the property.
We see no reason to suppose that the statute was intended to deprive him of that in
the interest of junior holders, unless by a substitute of the most indubitable
equivalence.
Id.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). Section 1129(b)(2) provides for confirmation of a reor-
ganization plan over the objections of a class of dissenting creditors. If two-thirds of each
class of creditors do not consent to the plan, then the plan must provide adequate protec-
458 [Vol. 22:455
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1129(b), a reorganization plan will not be confirmed over the objections of
a class of secured creditors unless present value compensation is in-
cluded.2 The holding of Murel and the interpretation of "indubitable
equivalent" under section 1129(b) may not be accurately extended to sec-
tion 361(3). 21 Murel involved the consideration of the cram down provi-
sions under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 which required adequate protec-
tion for the full value of the creditor's claim. Murel is good precedent
for adequate protection in the context of plan confirmation, but it may
not be considered as such in the context of section 361. 1'
D. Section 361: Its Interaction with Other Code Provisions
A review of the legislative history of section 361 does not clarify the
provision's language, nor the intent with which Congress enacted section
361. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the adequate protection con-
cept of section 361 in light of other provisions in the Code.2 An effort has
been made to discern Congress's intent in including the concept of ade-
quate protection in section 361 by analyzing sections 502 and 506 of the
Code.
In the case of a secured creditor, the allowable amount of the "secured
claim" is limited by the value of the collateral.3 3 The creditor has a se-
cured claim to the extent of the value of its collateral, and it has an un-
tion for the realization by them of the full value of their interest, claims or liens. See id. §
361.
28. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
29. The secured creditor's right to receive the present value of his collateral under a
reorganization plan is not sanctioned by the "indubitable equivalent" language in section
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii); rather, it stems from the provision guaranteeing payments "as of the ef-
fective date of the plan" that are equal to the value of the collateral. United Savings Assoc.
of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626, 633 (1988). The secured creditor
only receives payment of the prinicpal of his collateral upon confirmation of the reorganiza-
tion, and nt immediately, "as of the date of relief." Id. See Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation
in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1073 (1985) (explaining that the purpose for which
valuation of the collateral is made is important in determining what constitutes adequate
protection.).
30. Id.
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(3); see also General Elec. Mortgage Corp. v. South Village, Inc.,
25 Bankr. 987 (D. Utah 1982). The court, in determining whether an undersecured creditor
was entitled to lost opportunity cost for delay in foreclosure, concluded that the indubitable
equivalent language of section 361(3) is "fact-specific [to Murel], not a categorical impera-
tive." Id. at 992 n.4.
32. See In re All-Way Services, Inc., 73 Bankr. 556, 574 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (citing Kelly v.
Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353, 358 (1986) ("In expounding a statute, we must ... look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.").
33. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). "Allowed secured claim" is defined in § 506(a). If the credi-
tor is oversecured, the allowed secured claim is the amount of the debt. If he is under-
secured, it is the value of the collateral.
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secured claim for the balance of the claim. 4 Thus, the level of adequate
protection to which the creditor is entitled is based upon the "value" of
the creditor's interest in the property. 5 The Code provides no standards
for valuation even though valuation of the creditor's interest is a crucial
assessment for obtaining adequate protection or relief from the automatic
stay.s
Collateral may have a "going concern value" if a reorganization is in-
tended or a "liquidation value" if foreclosure is planned.3 7 Congress, in
enacting the Code, realized that there is wide latitude between the forced
sale liquidation value and the going concern value, yet it nonetheless
failed to set forth the method or timing of valuation.3s Although courts
are left to determine value on a case-by-case basis, it is clear under sec-
tion 506(a) that valuation varies according to the purpose of the valuation
and the proposed use of the collateral.3 " For that reason, granting lost
opportunity cost compensation to undersecured creditors is inconsistent
with the goal of section 506(a).4 °
Section § 502(b)(2) expressly disallows postpetition interest. The only
exception to that prohibition is found in section 506(b), which allows
oversecured creditors to accrue interest to the extent of the value of their
collateral.41 It provides that if a creditor, at the initiation of a Chapter 11
34. Id.
35. 2 QUITTNER & KRUGER, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 1986: THE SUBSTANTIVE PROCE-
DURAL BASICS (Practising Law Inst. 161 (1986)); see 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
36. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5840.
37. Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 29, at 1063.
38. The House Report stated that:
It is expected that the courts will apply the concept [of adequate protection] in light
of the facts of each case and general equitable principles. It is not intended that the
courts will develop a hard and fast rule that will apply in every case. The time and
method of valuation is not specified precisely, in order to avoid that result .... The
flexibility is important to permit the courts to adapt to varying circumstances and
changing modes of financing.
In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 394 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 338, 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6295).
39. Under § 506(a), the determination of value for the purpose of adequate protection
does not also indicate the collateral's value for purpose of the Code's "cram-down" provi-
sions used in plan confirmation. LUREY, LENDING TRANSACTIONS AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
636 (Practising Law Inst. 1986).
40. United Savings Assoc. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. 626, 630
(1988) concluded that "the 'interest in property' protected by § 362(d)(1) does not include a
secured party's right to immediate foreclosure." The Court stated that the meaning of Sec-
tion 362(d)(1)'s "interest in property" phrase should be afforded the same construction as
similar terminology in section 506(a), where the creditor's interest in property is interpreted
to mean "the value of the collateral." Id.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). Section 506(b) provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of
which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the
[Vol. 22:455
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proceeding, has a claim secured by collateral in excess of the value of the
debt, the creditor is entitled to postpetition interest on that collateral.42
An allowed secured claim includes any reasonable fees (including attor-
ney's fees), costs, or charges provided for in the agreement under which
the claim arose.43 The Code does not sanction postpetition interest pay-
ments for the undersecured creditor. To allow such compensation contra-
venes the express prohibition found in section 502(b)(2)."4
III. CASE INTERPRETATION OF ADEQUATE PROTECTION
Court decisions have not provided a uniform interpretation of the ade-
quate protection concept because the parameters of adequate protection
have not been defined. The circuit courts are split regarding what consti-
tutes adequate protection and how that protection is sufficiently given."
Some courts hold that the preservation of the value of the collateral is the
focus of adequate protection, 4" while others expand the adequate protec-
tion concept by requiring that it include compensation for undersecured
creditors for the delay in enforcing their rights against the collateral.
47
A. The Theory of Lost Opportunity Cost Compensation
The first case to require that opportunity cost compensation be in-
cluded as a part of the adequate protection provisions of the Code was In
re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.4" The court interpreted section 361 to
mean that the debtor must propose adequate protection under subsec-
tions (1) or (2) or "meet the standards set forth in section 361(3)."'4s In re
amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on
such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement
under which such claim arose.
42. Id; see In re Best Repair Co., 789 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1986); 3 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY § 506.05 (15th ed. 1988).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
44. If Congress had intended to give undersecured creditors interest on the value of their
collateral, such intention would have been explicitly set forth in section 506(b). Timbers,
108 S. Ct. 626, 631.
45. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits are among those courts that have held that adequate
protection requires the debtor to compensate the undersecured creditor for lost opportunity
costs with respect to the creditor's investment in the collateral. See, e.g., Grundy Nat'l Bank
v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); In re American Mariner Indus.,
Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984). The leading case holding that undersecured creditors
should only be compensated for a reduction in value caused by the debtor's continued use of
collateral is In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987).
46. See, e.g., In re Shriver, 33 Bankr. 176 (N.D. Ohio 1983); In re Pine Lake Village Apt.
Co., 16 Bankr. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 987 (D. Utah 1982).
47. See, e.g., American Mariner, 734 F.2d 426; In re Virginia Foundry Co., Inc., 9 Bankr.
493 (W.D. Va. 1981); In re Anchorage Boat Sales, 4 Bankr. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
48. 4 Bankr. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
49. Id. at 643. Although the court stated that the undersecured creditor was entitled to
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Virginia Foundry Co.,50 the first district court case to consider the issue,
emphasized that compensation for lost opportunity cost is necessary to
ensure that the creditor is given "essentially what he bargained for."'" In
Virginia Foundry, the creditor bank had been deprived of a valuable
right because it could not foreclose immediately upon its demand note
and have the use of its money at a current or market interest rate." In
order to protect the economic value of the bank's right to receive pay-
ment on demand, the court required the bank to be paid for lost opportu-
nity cost.53
In re American Mariner Industries, Inc.,54 has had the most significant
impact in developing the theory of lost opportunity cost compensation.
American Mariner received a loan that was secured by a perfected secur-
ity interest in "'basically all of the American Mariner's assets.' ,,51 When
American Mariner filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11, its
debt to the creditor amounted to $370,000, including accrued interest.56
That debt was secured by collateral worth $110,000. 57 The creditor sought
adequate protection in the form of monthly interest payments equal to
the return it would have realized had it liquidated the collateral and in-
vested the proceeds at the market rate .5 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy panel decision and
held that the creditor was entitled to adequate protection for the present
value of its interest in the collateral.59
The American Mariner court interpreted the legislative history of sec-
tion 361 to support its holding that the secured creditor's interest in the
relief under section 362(d)(1), the creditor was eventually granted relief under section
362(d)(2) when it was evident that there was no possibility of an effective reorganization.
50. 9 Bankr. 493 (W.D. Va. 1981).
51. Id. at 498 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 338, 339, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6295).
52. Id. This "valuable right" stems from state law which allows a secured party to repos-
sess and sell the property securing its claim if the debtor defaults on the underlying obliga-
tion. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-511 (Repl. Vol. 1984). This contractual right sanctioned
by state law is temporarily suspended by the Code's imposition of the automatic stay.
53. Virginia Foundry, 9 Bankr. at 498.
54. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 427.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 435. In American Mariner, this compensation took the form of monthly inter-
est payments at the market rate on the liquidation value of the collateral. Grundy Nat'l
Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436, 1441 (4th Cir. 1985) defined "market rate" as
"the prevailing rate for the same type of loan at issue, and not the lowest (or highest) mar-
ket rate for various types of other loans." Grundy agreed with American Mariner that there
should be maximum flexibility in fixing interest so that the creditor is given the value of his
bargained-for rights. If the contract rate of interest is lower than the current market rate,
then the interest payments may be based on the contract rate.
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collateral should be protected.60 The court asserted that the Congres-
sional goal of giving the creditor the benefit of its bargain supported its
holding.61 The decision also relied on the "indubitable equivalent" lan-
guage used in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) and in Murel as evidence of Con-
gress' intent to provide lost opportunity costs under section 361.2
B. Case Authority Refuting the Lost Opportunity Cost Theory
The line of cases holding that the creditor is entitled only to compensa-
tion for the depreciationin value of the collateral began with In re Pine
Lake Village Apartment Co.63 The court noted that the methods of ade-
quate protection listed in section 361 are "not exclusive of other means""
and rejected the argument that adequate protection must constitute the
"indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's interest in the property. 5 The
fact that section 506(b) entitles only oversecured parties to postpetition
interest supported the court's conclusion.66 A creditor's proper remedy for
undue delay in enforcing its rights is to file a motion to dismiss the Chap-
ter 11 case or convert it to a Chapter 7 case.6 7
In re South Village Inc.68 elaborated on a creditor's remedies for delay
provided under the Code. The Code limits the time in which the debtor
has the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization and permits confir-
mation of a Chapter 11 plan which provides for liquidation of the
debtor's assets.69 If the debtor has not filed a plan within 120 days after it
requests relief under Chapter 11, then any party in interest (including a
creditor) may file a plan.7 0
60. American Mariner, 734 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1984).
61. Id.
Secured Creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their bargain. There may
be situations in bankruptcy where giving a secured creditor an absolute right to his
bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimental to the bankruptcy laws. Thus,
this section [§ 3611 recognizes the availability of alternate means of protecting a se-
cured creditor's interest.
Id. at 431 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 338, 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6295).
62. Id. at 433.
63. 19 Bankr. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The majority of lower courts that considered the lost
opportunity cost issue prior to American Mariner held that a secured creditor is entitled
only to protection against a decline in the value of its collateral through depreciation. See,
e.g., In re Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 38 Bankr. 595, 598 (D. Idaho 1984); In re Saypol, 31
Bankr. 796, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 808 (D.
Utah 1981).
64. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 338, 344, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6300.
65. Pine Lake Village, 19 Bankr. at 824, 827.
66. Id. at 828.
67. Id.
68. 25 Bankr. 987, 1000-02 (D. Utah 1982).
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b)(1982).
70. Id. § 1121(c).
19881
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In juxtaposition to American Mariner, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has recently denied the payment of lost opportunity costs to
undersecured creditors. In support of its decision in In re Timbers of In-
wood Forest Associates,71 the court reviewed the legislative history of ad-
equate protection, including the enactment of the Family Farmer Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1986.72 The court stated that the Congressional overruling
of American Mariner did not constitute a Congressional adoption of it in
Chapter 11.73 Timbers viewed section 1205 as a Congressional response to
the urgent problem of farm bankruptcies and as legislation limited to the
scope of farm reorganizations. 74  P
Timbers emphasized that Congress has provided a wide range of reme-
dies for the secured creditors of a debtor who cannot feasibly reorganize
or who unreasonably delays in its attempt at reorganization.7 5 The key to
achieving an equilibrium between the debtor's right to reorganize and the
creditor's need for protection is "early and stringent judicial management
of the case."'7 6 At the outset of a Chapter 11 filing the bankruptcy judge
must assess whether the goal of reorganization can be efficiently met.
7 7
Ideally, Chapter 11 should benefit creditors by preserving going-concern
values and avoiding liquidation of the collateral at forced-sale prices.
78 If
going-concern values are maintained, then all creditors benefit from the
reorganization. In the event that reorganization is not pragmatic, it is the
responsibility of the bankruptcy court to effectuate the remedies provided
by the Code.7 9
71. 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
72. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (Supp. IV 1986).
73. Timbers, 808 F.2d at 369.
74. Id. Timbers states that "the 1986 enactment [of Chapter 12] was farm bankruptcy
legislation, not a comprehensive overhaul of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at
370.
75. Id. at 372.
76. Id. at 373.
77. Id. Whether the debtor is seriously pursuing reorganization is a threshold issue
which is determined by evaluating whether the debtor has exerted a "tangible effort" at
reorganization. See, e.g., In re Mikole Developers, Inc., 14 Bankr. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The
plan must also be a feasible one. See In re Clark Technical Assocs., 9 Bankr. 739 (D. Conn.
1981) (holding that an attempt to revive a factory business which is based on a prospective
market improvement and no available financing is insufficient to retain the stay). 11 U.S.C. §
1112(b)(1) permits dismissal of a bankruptcy case upon proof of "absence of a reasonable
likelihood of rehabilitation" and "continuing loss" to the estate.
78. Timbers, 808 F.2d at 373.
79. Id. at 372.
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C. The U.S. Supreme Court's Affirmation of Timbers
The U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision
in In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,s° denying an undersecured
creditor the right to lost opportunity cost compensation. The Court relied
heavily on statutory analysis to determine that the Timbers creditor was
not entitled to compensation for the delay it experienced in foreclosing on
its collateral.
Statutory interpretation cannot support the lost opportunity cost com-
pensation theory because it impliedly contravenes section 506(b), which
denies an undersecured creditor postpetition interest on its claims."' The
Court analogized the "interest in property" phrase found in section
362(d)(1) to a similar phrase in section 506(a). The result of such an anal-
ogy is that an undersecured creditor's "interest in propeity" does not en-
compass the right to immediate possession of its property upon the
debtor's default.8 2
Under section 552(b), an undersecured creditor who possesses a per-
fected security interest in postpetition rents or profits from collateral may
use such "proceeds" to satisfy its claim, giving the creditor holding the
perfected security interest priority over unsecured claims."' If an under-
secured creditor were granted compensation for the "use value" of its col-
lateral under section 362, section 552(b) would be nullified, since an un-
dersecured creditor could realize the "use value" of its collateral without
holding a perfected security interest in that collateral.8" Furthermore,
should section 362(d)(1) be interpreted to include lost opportunity cost
compensation, then the construction given section 362(d)(2) would be
manipulated to the point of "nonsense.''s5
The Supreme Court also cited the inapplicability of the "indubitable
equivalent" language found in In re Murel Holding Corp.88 and in section
1129 to an analysis of section 361(3).17 The context in which the indubita-
ble equivalent language is used is important because it is ultimately based
on a distinction between the reorganized debtor and the debtor in process
of reorganization. 8
80. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
81. Id. at 631.
82. Id. at 630; see supra note 41.
83. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982); see also Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 631.
84. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 632.
85. Id. If Section 362(d)(1) considered an undersecured creditor's inability to immedi-
ately foreclose as always justifying relief from the automatic stay, then section 362(d)(2) is a
"practical nullity." Id. Under such circumstances, an undersecured creditor would only seek
relief under section 362(d)(2) if "its collateral was not depreciating ... and it was receiving
market rate interest on its collateral, but nonetheless wanted to foreclose." Id.
86. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
87. Id. at 633-34.
88. "The organized debtor is supposed to stand on his own two feet. The debtor in pro-
cess of reorganization, by contrast, is given many temporary protections against the normal
operation of the law." Id. at 634.
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In affirming the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court gave no
merit to the creditor's reliance on the legislative history of sections 361
and 362(d)(1) to contend that lost opportunity cost compensation is valid
recompense for delay imposed by the automatic stay. 9 The Court was
straightforward, insisting that the "plain textual indication" in the Code
is to not grant undersecured creditors lost opportunity cost
compensation."
D. The Equilibrium: In re Briggs
Tempering the extremes of the two theories of adequate protection es-
poused in In re American Mariner Industries" and In re Timbers of In-
wood Forest Associates"2 is In re Briggs Transp. CoY" Briggs rejected the
notion that lost opportunity cost is an essential and inflexible element of
adequate protection as articulated in American Mariner." Interest pay-
ments, however, may be permitted within the discretion of the bank-
ruptcy court.9 5 Briggs insisted that courts must approach the question of
adequate protection on a case-by-case basis in order to best determine
which interests of the creditor should be protected during the pendency
of the stay.96 The court accepted the debtor's contention that adequate
protection focuses on the value of the collateral itself and not the value of
the creditor's whole bargain.9 7
Among the factors to be considered in determining the right to oppor-
tunity cost payments are: (1) the quality of the collateral; (2) the duration
of the stay; (3) whether the value of the collateral is appreciating, depre-
89. Id. The legislative history of sections 361 and 362(d)(1) contains "not a hint" that
undersecured creditors should be granted post petition interest. Furthermore, Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code does not sanction an absolute right to foreclose. Id.
90. Id. at 634-35. A drastic change in the Code would not be made without supporting
provisions in the text or explanatory comments in the legislative history. Id.
91. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
92. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
93. 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
94. Id. at 1350-51. American Mariner had held that lost opportunity cost compensation
to undersecured creditors was required as a matter of law. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at
435.
95. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1348-51.
96. Id. at 1349.
97. Id. at 1342. The court supported this conclusion by explaining that secured creditors
do not have a constitutional claim for more than is required to preserve the value of their
collateral. Id. The temporary delay in foreclosure imposed by the stay is not an unlawful
taking under the Fifth Amendment. Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278
(1940).
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ciating or stable; (4) whether taxes and other payments designed to keep
the collateral free of statutory liens are being paid; and (5) the prospects
for reorganization.9 8 In sum, Briggs requires that adequate protection al-
ways compensate for depreciation, but compensate for lost opportunity
costs only when reorganization becomes unlikely.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE FAMILY FARMER BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1986 ON
THE ADEQUATE PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The most recent Congressional "statement" with respect to the ade-
quate protection provisions of the Code is in the context of the Family
Bankruptcy Act of 1986."9 The Act states that the adequate protection
provisions of section 361 do not apply to Chapter 12 family farmer reor-
ganization cases.100 Section 1205 gives separate examples of adequate pro-
tection for those filing under Chapter 12.101 Although it restates much of
section 361, section 1205 adds rental value as a form of adequate protec-
tion for Chapter 12 cases. ' 2 Therefore, the debtor whose collateral is
farmland may provide adequate protection by paying "the reasonable
rent customary in the community where the property is located, based
upon the rental value, net income, and earning capacity of the
property."'' 3
98. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1349.
99. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (Supp. IV 1986).
100. Id. at § 1205(a).
101. Id. Section 1205 provides that:
(a) Section 361 does not apply in a case under this chapter.
(b) In a case under this chapter, when adequate protection is required under section
362, 363, or 364 of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate
protection may be provided by-
(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to
such entity, to the extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale, or
lease, under section 363 of this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this
title results in a decrease in the value of property securing a claim or of an entity's
ownership interest in property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that
such stay, use, sale, lease or grant results in a decrease in the value of property
securing a claim or of an entity's ownership interest in property;
(3) paying to such entity for the use of farmland the reasonable rent customary in
the community where the property is located, based upon the rental value, net in-
come, and earning capacity of the property; or
(4) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to compensation al-
lowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense, as will
adequately protect the value of property securing a claim or of such entity's owner-
ship interest in the property.
102. Id. at § 1205(3).
103. Id. For a discussion of the possible economic inefficiencies which could result from
the rental value provision under § 1205(3), see Herbert, Once More Unto the Breach Dear,
Friends: The 1986 Reforms of the Reformed Bankruptcy Reform Act, 16 CAP. U.L. REv. 325,
345-46 (1987).
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Most significant for the purpose of this analysis is the fact that section
1205(b) makes clear that an undersecured creditor may not receive com-
pensation for a delay in enforcing its rights in the property during a
Chapter 12 proceeding.10 4 Section 1205 eliminates the "indubitable
equivalent" language of section 361(3) and requires that the value of the
collateral and not the value of the creditor's "interest" in that collateral
be protected.10 5 A farmer must provide protection of the creditor's "own-
ership interest in the property,"10 the "value of property securing a
claim, 1"0 7 or, if the collateral is farmland, the "reasonable rent customary
in the community."' 08
In light of the legislative history of Chapter 12, section 1205(b) cannot
be interpreted as allowing for lost opportunity costs.' 9 The conference
report states that there is "a separate test for adequate protection in
Chapter 12 cases . . .[that] eliminates the need of the family farmer to
pay lost opportunity costs." The rationale underlying the expressed pro-
hibition of lost opportunity costs is that farmland values have dropped
dramatically and that mandating the payment of lost opportunity costs
could seriously hinder farm reorganization.'"
Section 1205 makes no distinction between oversecured and under-
secured creditors."' While it is recognized under section 502(b)(2) that
oversecured creditors may receive postpetition interest in a Chapter 11
proceeding," 2 there is no such provision in Chapter 12. A matter for de-
bate has been whether Congress, in enacting section 1205, intended to
endorse the American Mariner rule in Chapter 11 cases. Appropriately,
In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,"' resolved this question in
the negative. The impact of mandatory lost opportunity cost payments is
such that they cannot be considered a matter of law based on inferences
drawn from Chapter 12. Congress has repeatedly emphasized the flexibil-
ity with which the concept of adequate protection must be applied.""
Section 1205 is not a wholesale approval or prohibition of the payment of
lost opportunity costs under Chapter 11. In limiting the parameters of
adequate protection under Chapter 12, Congress responded to an urgent
situation where the indiscriminate application of lost opportunity cost
104. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.07 (15th ed. 1988).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1205(b)(1) - (3); see In re Rennich, 70 Bankr. 69, 72 (D.S.D. 1987).
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 1205(b)(1)-(3).
107. Id. § 1205(b)(1)-(2).
108. Id. § 1205(b)(3).
109. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5246, 5250.
110. Id.
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 1205.
112. See id. § 506(b)(2); see In re Best Repair Co., 789 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1986).
113. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 39.
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compensation could be devastating. The important point to be gleaned
from Congress's statement in the Act is that adequate protection cannot
be based on an unyielding rule. The analysis scheme set forth in In re
Briggs"5 is necessary to effect a fair remedy to the inherently complex
questions faced in each bankruptcy case.
V. ADEQUATE PROTECTION: THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY WITHOUT
RIGIDITY
Although some courts have held that adequate protection is a matter of
law, the purpose of adequate protection will only be served if it is recog-
nized as a question of fact.""' The debtors must be permitted "maximum
flexibility in structuring a proposal for adequate protection."1"7 Courts
have taken a more active role in fashioning protection for creditors,""
rather than simply modifying a debtor's adequate protection proposal. 1 9
The "maximum flexibility" which Congress intended to grant the
debtor derives from the varying needs and circumstances of the parties,
depending on the characteristics of the loan transaction and the estab-
lished relationship between the creditor and the debtor. 2 0 An accurate
assessment of adequate protection hinges largely upon the type of collat-
eral sought to be protected. The rapid depreciation of equipment may be
sufficiently countered by periodic cash payments to the creditor. 121 Real
estate, on the other hand, is usually less subject to rapid depreciation
through use or aging. A junior lienholder in a real estate case is generally
most concerned about losing his recoverable value during a bankruptcy
case. 22 In floating collateral cases,' 23 the greatest threat to a creditor's
recoverable value is dissipation or consumption of the property, such as
115. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
116. In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339, 1348 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Martin, 761 F.2d
472, 474 (8th Cir. 1985); In re George Ruggiere Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 727 F.2d 1017, 1019
(11th Cir. 1984).
117. In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 435 (9th Cir. 1984).
118. See In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803 (D. Utah 1981).
119. See In re Irving A. Horns Farms, Inc., 42 Bankr. 832, 838 (D. Iowa 1984) (stating
that it is not the court's duty to fashion adequate protection, but merely to modify that
which the debtor has proposed).
120. For example, in In re Wheeler, 12 Bankr. 908 (D. Mass. 1981), the court's willing-
ness to retain a stay was linked in part to the debtor's prior good record of making pay-
ments on the loan, coupled with a willingness to continue full payment after filing for
bankruptcy.
121. See Nimmer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay: Variable Bargain Models
of Fairness, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1, 19 (1983).
122. See id. at 41.
123. "Floating collateral," also referred to as "floating security," would include inven-
tory, accounts and other property expected to be sold or otherwise dissipated over a rela-
tively brief period of time. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 481 (3d ed. 1969).
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the sale of an item of inventory or the collection of the account. 24 In such
cases, cash payments alone may not be sufficient to provide the creditor
with protection.
A standard rule of adequate protection is not possible because the type
of collateral which is the subject of the loan transaction varies from case
to case. In American Mariner, the creditor's interest in floating collateral
put it at greater risk of having its interest extinguished. It must be noted,
however, that during a creditor's negotiation of a loan, the potential cred-
itor knows the- possibility of debtor default.'25 The interest rate charged
to the debtor is evidence of that knowledge. An undersecured creditor has
set its own terms; so, if it had initially bargained for sufficient collateral,
then the debt would be protected by the value of that collateral. 2 ' Fur-
thermore, the detailed rules of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
provide more than sufficient guidelines for the secured creditor. The se-
cured creditor must receive notification if other parties attach the
debtor's property.' 2" The creditor is then solely in control of deciding
whether to suspend, continue, or extend its existing bargain with the
debtor.
VI. THE ULTIMATE QUESTION: DEBTOR REHABILITATION VERSUS
CREDITOR MAXIMIZATION
The issue of whether adequate protection encompasses lost opportunity
cost compensation is one of policy and economics. Bankruptcy law is
designed to distribute the costs of default among those at risk, and to
provide an orderly system for the division of the debtor's estate. 28 In
Bankruptcy Policy, Elizabeth Warren adeptly describes the primary con-
flict in bankruptcy as a creditor-versus-creditor rather than a creditor-
versus-debtor scenario. 2 9 Blanket compensation for lost opportunity
costs merely acts to prevent creditors from sharing in the debtor's "asset
pool." Furthermore, the realization of the creditor's interest in the pre-
sent value of the collateral imposes a greater strain on an already finan-
cially insolvent party. Requiring opportunity cost payments as a matter
of law runs counter to Chapter l1's reorganization policy. The goal of
Chapter 11 is to "relieve the debtor of its pre-petition debts, to free cash
124. The creditor's lien typically transfers to proceeds of these dispositions of the collat-
eral, but if proceeds are cash, may be commingled, and the creditor's interest is then subject
to extinction. See U.C.C. § 9-306 (1978).
125. Note, Adequate Protection of Time Value for Undersecured Creditors During the
Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy: Where Are We After American Mariner? 2 BANKR. DEVS. J.
341, 359 (1985).
126. Id.
127. See U.C.C. § 9-312 (1978).
128. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cdi. L. REv. 775, 790 (1987).
129. Id. at 785.
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flow to meet current operating expenses, and ultimately to permit the
debtor to 'restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to op-
erate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a
return for its stockholders.' "10 In general, the lost opportunity cost the-
ory thwarts that goal.
The symbiotic relationship that exists between a debtor and its credi-
tors makes the balancing of each party's interests even more complex and
crucial to the economic health of all involved. The scope of a bank-
ruptcy's impact is not limited to the creditor and debtor. A host of other
parties are involved, such as employees, customers, and suppliers. A
bankruptcy also affects property values and state and local tax bases.1"1
The interests that reorganization promotes benefit the nation's employ-
ment, gross national product, and American business as a whole.13 2 All of
these factors must be considered when evaluating whether a creditor
should be paid lost opportunity costs.
Supporters of the lost opportunity cost theory maintain that collectiv-
ism is the policy goal underlying the Bankruptcy Code. 133 Collectivism is
best served, however, by allowing both unsecured and secured creditors to
share in the assets of the bankrupt's estate. The dissent in In re Timbers
of Inwood Forest Associates,"13 which argues that requiring postpetition
interest payments will promote prompt agreement to a plan, is an anoma-
lous assessment. If a creditor receives lost opportunity cost compensation
and is allowed to foreclose if the debtor defaults, then the creditor's in-
centive to negotiate a Chapter 11 plan certainly dissipates.
Lost opportunity cost payments could also result in an unciersecured
creditor receiving more than its oversecured counterpart."35 Under section
506(b), the accrual of interest is limited to the value of the property ex-
ceeding the amount of the claim.1 36 (This is referred to as the creditor's
"equity cushion."). Section 506(b) allows the interest to accrue, but it is
not immediately paid out."s7 The lost opportunity cost theory, however,
does not limit an undersecured creditor to its equity cushion and requires
130. In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5963, 6179).
131. Warren, supra note 128, at 788.
132. See 124 CONG. REC. 32,392 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. 33,990 (1978) (discussing the
policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code to protect communities from the impact of
bankruptcy).
133. See, e.g, Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 815 (1987).
134. 808 F.2d 363, 383 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
626 (1988).
135. See M. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 199-200 (1987).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982).
137. Id.
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the immediate payment of interest. Oversecured creditors would become
a rare commodity if such an interpretation were uniformly adopted.
Inextricably connected to the grant of lost opportunity costs are the
questions of the timing of and the method by which valuation is deter-
mined.138 These are complex issues for which Congress has provided no
guidelines. 139 A practice of automatically awarding undersecured creditors
lost opportunity cost compensation may not be in the best interest of
those creditors. In a situation in which the liquidation value of the collat-
eral is substantially less than its going concern value, creditors will bene-
fit more from working toward the goal of reorganization. 40 A policy of
maximizing the return to creditors seems worthy on its face. However,
such a policy cannot be effectively realized in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding. The theory becomes that of maximization of profits for the
few, with devastating repercussions on other creditors, the debtor, and
our nation's economy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The adequate protection provisions of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978141
set forth an amorphous set of guidelines to be applied on a case-by-case
basis. A uniform model or rule cannot be constructed when it is vital that
each case be considered in light of its unique set of circumstances. Vary-
ing standards are unavoidable in order to achieve the rehabilitative goal
of bankruptcy policy. For this reason, Congress crafted the concept of
adequate protection to serve as a flexible model. Congress, however, did
not neglect to provide a detailed scheme for plan filing and confirmation
and remedies to a creditor suffering from a delay in those proceedings.
Adequate protection was not fashioned as a creditor's sole remedy-it
must be viewed with reference to the other provisions contained in the
Code.
The United States Supreme Court's affirmation of In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Associates acknowledged that the creditor had never
sought relief from the automatic stay under section 362(d)(2) of the Code
on any ground other than lack of adequate protection.142 Relief, therefore,
is by no means precluded when section 362(d)(1) is unsuccessfully sought
as relief from the stay.
A bankruptcy filing is not an optimum situation for any of the parties
involved. Creditors should not be permitted to construe adequate protec-
138. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
139. See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 29, at 1068-69.
140. M. BIENENSTOCK, supra note 135, at 196-99.
141. Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
142. United Savings Assoc. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626,
635 (1988).
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tion as their panacea to a debtor's default. When In re American Mariner
Industries, Inc.143 held that undersecured creditors are entitled to lost
opportunity cost compensation as a matter of law, the court considered
one group's interests as distinct from the interconnected and dependent
interests of all the parties to the bankruptcy proceeding.
A balance can be achieved between debtor rehabilitation and protec-
tion of the creditors' rights. Lost opportunity cost compensation may be
justified in certain circumstances. The payment of lost opportunity cost,
however, will be the exception, rather than the rule. Any conclusions re-
garding whether a creditor is adequately protected may follow only after
careful examination of the factors set forth in In re Briggs Transporta-
tion Co.'4
Amy S. Ashworth
143. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
144. 780 F.2d 1339, 1349-50 (8th Cir. 1985).
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